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Abstract
Newly public companies tend to exhibit abnormally high accruals in the year of their initial public offering
(IPO). Although the prevailing view in the literature is that these accruals are caused by opportunistic
misreporting, we show that these accruals do not appear to benefit managers and instead result from the
normal economic activity of newly public companies. In particular, and in contrast to the notion that
managers benefit from inflating accruals through an inflated issue price, inflated post-IPO equity values,
and increased insider trading profits, we find no evidence of a relation between abnormal accruals and
these outcomes. Instead, consistent with these accruals resulting from normal economic activity, we find
that these accruals are attributable to the investment of IPO proceeds in working capital and that
controlling for the amount of IPO proceeds invested in working capital produces a more powerful accrualbased measure of misreporting.
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Abstract
This study investigates the determinants and trading performance of outside directors’ equity deferrals,
which represent the choice to convert part or all of their annual cash compensation into deferred
company stock. Using a large sample of S&P1500 firms that allowed directors to defer their cash fees
into equity between 1999 and 2009, we find significant associations between equity deferral choices and
specific features of the director compensation plans, proxies for directors’ outside wealth diversification,
and future firm stock market performance. Trading performance analyses indicate that outside directors
earn substantial abnormal returns from their deferrals, with a significant proportion of the deferral
transactions occurring during blackout periods. These results are consistent with companies structuring
director equity deferral plans to circumvent SEC Rule 10b-5’s trading restrictions.
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1. Introduction
A long line of research in accounting and finance has examined the design of executive
and director compensation plans, with a particular emphasis on the choice between cash and
equity incentives (see Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2003; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009 for reviews).
The past decade has seen an increasing number of firms offer their corporate board members the
option to convert some or all of their annual cash compensation into deferred company stock, to
be delivered upon termination of service (see Frederic Cook & Co. Inc., 2012-2014). These
“equity deferral options” are interesting for two reasons. First, when exercised, executives and
directors give up a sure amount of cash today for equity with uncertain future value, while
substantially increasing the proportion of their annual pay that is tied to future firm performance.
Second, the equity deferrals can act as a form of insider trading, with the deferral plans
structured to circumvent SEC Rule 10b-5’s trading restrictions.
We focus on equity deferral choices by outside directors for three reasons. First, proxy
statement descriptions of the director deferral plans allow us to determine whether the directors
made the choice to defer current cash compensation into future stock. Such choices cannot be
measured unequivocally for corporate executives since the deferral options offered to executives
usually allow them to defer any part of their annual compensation (i.e., cash and/or equity) into
equity, with the deferral of current equity usually made for tax reasons. Second, equity deferral
choices by outside directors typically are less affected by the liquidity and diversification
constraints of corporate executives, since most of their earned income and cumulated wealth
comes from outside the firm. Third, equity deferrals represent an un-investigated setting to study
outside directors’ decisions to invest in the firm’s stock, thereby contributing to the scarce
empirical evidence on insider trading by outside board members.
We examine the determinants and trading performance of director equity deferrals using
a large hand-collected sample of S&P1500 firms that allowed outside directors to defer their
cash compensation into equity between 1999 and 2009. Sample distributions across years and
S&P indices indicate that the proportion of firms offering equity deferral options to directors
significantly increased over the years and as a function of firm size. Among S&P500 firms, an
average of 58% of the firms offered these options to directors, with an increase from 46% in
1999 to 63% in 2009. We first investigate the board and firm characteristics associated with the
firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors. Results from these analyses indicate
that the options are used by larger firms as a substitute for standard director stock option and
share grants and as a means to allow directors to increase their existing ownership in the firm.
Among other firm characteristics, the likelihood that a firm offers equity deferral options to
1

directors also varies with the provision of similar options to executives, the firm’s cash
constraint status, and past performance.
We next investigate the factors affecting directors’ equity deferral decisions. We collect
equity deferral transaction data from Thompson Insider trading filings and test the associations
between the equity deferrals and three sets of variables: specific contractual features of the
director compensation plan; the firm’s future stock market performance; and a vector of director
personal characteristics. We find that variables measuring each of these dimensions are
significantly associated with sample directors’ equity deferrals. Controlling for the amount of
deferrable cash and existence of premiums, director equity deferral values increase with the predeferral director compensation paid through equity. This result suggests that the perceived
under-diversification costs brought about by the deferrals are lower for directors already
committed to compensation contracts with higher equity incentives. Consistent with information
arguments, we find strong positive associations between the directors’ equity deferrals and: i)
the deferral elections made by corporate executives; and ii) the firm’s future stock market
performance. Directors’ personal characteristics are also significant predictors, with the deferred
amounts decreasing with proxies for the directors’ wealth currently tied to firm performance and
increasing with proxies for the directors’ outside wealth diversification.
Our results are robust to a variety of model specifications and hold over a sub-sample of
directors serving on multiple boards. This sub-sample is particularly relevant for the purposes of
our analyses because those unobservable director characteristics likely associated with the
decision to defer (e.g., the director’s outside wealth and/or risk aversion) are held constant
across all boards the directors serve on. Moreover, since multiple-board directors often elect to
defer in some firms but not in others, this sub-sample provides a powerful setting to examine the
relative importance of insider information versus other factors such as contractual features and
directorship characteristics in motivating directors to purchase equity through deferrals.
Our third set of analyses examines the trading performance of director equity deferrals.
We assess the level of private information outside directors exploit through their deferrals by
measuring the abnormal returns the directors earn from these transactions using various horizons
and alternative abnormal returns measures. Across all measurement windows and estimation
methods, deferring directors realize significant abnormal returns from their deferrals.
Comparisons to the returns the non-deferring directors would have realized if they had exercised
their equity deferral options at their firms suggest that the abnormal returns result from deferring
directors conditioning their transactions based on some form of insider information. Consistent
with these conjectures, results from cross-sectional analyses show that the returns vary
significantly with various proxies for the directors’ monitoring abilities and access to material
2

private information at their firms. The abnormal returns deferring directors realize are higher in
firms with low governance quality and boards with higher proportions of insiders, and lower in
firms with higher analyst coverage and more frequent management forecasts. These results
provide strong evidence that directors earn larger returns in settings where their ability to
acquire and trade upon private information about the firm is higher.
Finally, we investigate whether equity deferrals provide a mechanism for directors to
conduct stealth insider trading in periods when open market purchases of the firm’s stock would
violate U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 is the antifraud provision promulgated in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule defines “stealth”
insider trading as the act of buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other
relationship of trust, while in possession of “material non-public information” about the
security. The SEC has expressed concerns that executives and directors can use Rule 10b5-1
plans to sidestep blackout period trading restrictions. Rule 10b5-1 plans allow insiders to make
trades pursuant to a pre-set schedule that provides them with an affirmative defence against
claims of insider trading. Trades under 10b5-1 plans are not subject to trading restrictions during
blackout periods. Since companies can design director deferral plans to comply with 10b5-1
rules, directors can use the deferrals to effectively conduct stealth insider trading. 1 Our blackout
period trading results strongly support these concerns.
Our paper makes four primary contributions. By examining equity deferral options
together with other director compensation and board characteristics, we extend the limited
literature on the firm’s provision of equity incentives to outside directors (e.g., Hermalin and
Weisbach, 1991; Yermack, 2004; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Fich and Shivdasani, 2005; Linn
and Park, 2005). Second, our analyses of the determinants of directors’ equity deferrals allow us
to contribute to related research on employees’ decisions to invest in the firm’s equity through
savings plans or stock purchases (e.g., Benartzi, 2001; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and
Roulstone, 2005; Benartzi et al., 2007). In particular, director equity deferral choices provide
evidence on the factors influencing directors’ revealed preference for equity versus cash pay.
Third, our results extend the limited evidence on the information content of outside directors’
insider trades (Ravina and Sapienza, 2009; Cook and Wang, 2011). The availability of a sample
that includes multiple directors who are covered by the same firm’s compensation contract and
share the same information environment, as well as directors who sit on multiple boards but
vary their deferral choices by company, allows us to disentangle the relative importance of
personal, contractual, and firm-specific information explanations on director trading activities.
1

Sections 2 and 5.2 provide further details on the application of Rules 10b-5 and 10b5-1 in the context of nonqualified deferred compensation plans.
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Perhaps most importantly, our study provides further evidence on strategic insider trading under
10b5-1 plans (Jagolinzer, 2009), an issue of considerable SEC interest. Although Ravina and
Sapienza (2009) find that outside board members earn abnormal returns from their purchases,
they do not investigate how directors can conduct informed trades without violating SEC Rule
10b-5. Our trading results provide evidence that outside directors can use 10b5-1 compliant
deferral plans to trade while circumventing Rule 10b-5’s restrictions.
The remainder of the paper consists of six sections. Section 2 provides institutional
details on the deferral options available to corporate outside directors. Section 3 presents our
sample and tests for the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors. Section 4
presents results from analyses investigating the factors affecting directors’ equity deferrals.
Section 5 investigates the trading performance and timing of the deferrals. Section 6 concludes.

2. Institutional background
Deferral options for outside directors are a common compensation element in U.S.
boardrooms (see National Association of Corporate Directors, 2004; Conference Board, 2006).
When exercised, the option to defer cash compensation into equity has two significant
consequences for the directors. First, the directors face no current taxation on the cash that is
deferred. To remain untaxed, however, the deferrals plus the investment returns must be
unfunded.

2

Second, the value of the shares received at the time of the deferral equals the

amount of the deferred cash, but their ultimate value will depend upon stock price changes over
the deferral period (typically the end of the director’s mandate on the board). Conventional
wisdom suggests that tax benefits drive the decision to defer, since pre-tax deferrals generate
larger returns than an investment in the firm’s stock made with after-tax dollars. However, the
gains from pre-tax deferrals may not be sufficient to compensate the directors for the risks they
assume by deferring into an instrument with uncertain ultimate value (see Den Uyl, 1998;
Ronald and Topper, 1998). These arguments imply that the deferrals could benefit directors by
providing a tax-advantaged alternative to open market purchases of the firm’s shares.
Compensation and governance commentators argue that equity deferral options can also
allow directors to achieve a variety of non-tax objectives. First, these options give directors the
flexibility to adjust their compensation mix to their personal preferences and employment
circumstances (see Baldwin and Wilson, 1998). Second, equity deferral plans have been
promoted as an effective means to increase directors’ ownership in the firm (e.g., Mercer
2

Equity deferrals (as well as pensions and cash deferrals) are nonqualified compensation arrangements under
IRC§409A tax rules. For directors to defer income tax on this compensation, these arrangements are almost always
unfunded and unsecured, and therefore at risk of insolvency like other unsecured debt if the firm becomes
financially distressed (see McNeil, 2009).

4

Consulting, 2003; Conference Board, 2006), with some firms using these options to allow
directors to meet stock ownership guidelines in a cost-effective and flexible manner. Third,
survey evidence suggests that an increasing number of firms have introduced director deferral
plans, which are similar in many respects to tax-advantaged savings plans that allow
investments in the company stock, as replacements for contentious director retirement plans
(MCG Consulting Group, 1999; Campbell et al., 2006). 3
The Appendix to the paper provides examples of common proxy statement descriptions
of the deferral plans firms offer to corporate outside directors. These disclosures range from
approximately 100 to 800 words describing the deferral options available to directors. Most
firms give directors full discretion over how much cash to defer in the year and whether to redefer amounts deferred in previous years. In case of re-deferrals, the transaction is recorded as if
the director receives the cash equivalents from her prior deferrals and re-makes the choice to
further defer these in stock units. The election to defer into the company’s stock may be
accompanied by an automatic grant of additional shares (i.e., “premiums”), usually expressed as
a percentage of the deferred cash. Firms often provide directors with the alternative option to
invest the deferred amounts into interest crediting cash accounts rather than in equity. Under
such arrangements, the directors can defer the cash compensation into either the company’s
accounts and earn a fixed or variable rate based on some formula or index (e.g., such as prime
rate or cost of capital), 4 or into deferred stock units and gain from stock price improvements.
Firms currently are not required to disclose outside directors’ deferred compensation
amounts, whether made in interest crediting cash accounts or in equity, in their proxy
statements. 5 The only exception is when the deferrals generate phantom shares. In this case, the
deferred stock units must be reported in a summary table of the “Director Compensation” subsection of the firm’s proxy statements. For all other equity deferrals, the only publicly available
information on these transactions can be retrieved from the Form-4 insider trading filings the
SEC requires directors to submit upon the election to convert cash into deferred stock units.
Directors receive their first option to defer upon their election to the board. In subsequent
years, directors usually are allowed to defer at the end of the year preceding the year in which
3

We observe trends consistent with this evidence in our sample, with a significant increase in the proportion of
firms with director ownership guidelines and a rapid disappearance of director retirement plans after 2004. While in
1999 only 8% of sample firms had director ownership guidelines, by 2009 45% of the firms had such guidelines.
Similarly, the proportion of firms with director retirement plans decreased from 13% in 1999 to 0.9% after 2004.
4
Of the firms in our sample that disclose the cash investments offered to directors, 22% offer an indexed yield
based on prime rates, 16% a rate based on the average 6-month, 5-year, or 10-year treasury bond rates, and 8% a
rate tied to long-term debt, such as the Moody’s corporate bond rate or the applicable U.S. federal rate published by
the IRS. The rest credit a variable rate based on various corporate investment or employee savings funds.
5
Although the SEC proxy rule reform of 2007 requires public firms to disclose detailed information about
executive pension benefits and deferred compensation, the SEC still does not require firms to report this
information for outside directors (see http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.pdf for more details).
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the cash will be earned, or based on a pre-set schedule, such as at the beginning of each quarter.
Other firms do not disclose restrictions on the frequency and timing of the deferrals, with the
directors being allowed to defer at any time in the year.
When based on a pre-set schedule, the equity deferral plans can be structured to meet the
requirements of SEC Rule 10b5-1 (see, for example, the extract from First Community Bank’s
2005 proxy statement in the Appendix). This rule provides an affirmative defence against claims
of insider trading if the 10b5-1 plan’s trading schedule was set at a time when the person was
not aware of any material non-public information. Firms currently are not required to report to
the SEC or disclose to shareholders their 10b5-1 plans’ details. A number of additional
loopholes in the rule, such as the ability of companies to enter into, amend, or cancel these plans
on short notice, and/or of directors to cancel pre-scheduled transactions without penalties (since
the SEC does not consider a “non-purchase” to be a violation of Rule 10b-5) has led the SEC to
raise concerns that deferral plans set in accordance with Rule 10b5-1 help directors to
circumvent insider trading restrictions (Good et al., 2013; Pulliam and Barry, 2013).

6

3. Firms offering equity deferral options to directors
3.1. Sample construction
We begin constructing our sample from the population of firms at the intersection of
ExecuComp and RiskMetrics over the years 1999 to 2009. We require firms’ coverage on both
datasets to collect information on outside directors’ annual compensation and selected directorlevel characteristics we use in our analyses. For all firms in the ExecuComp-RiskMetrics
intersection (i.e., 14,017 firm-years), we conduct a keyword search on LivEdgar to identify
those firms allowing directors to defer annual cash compensation into deferred stock units in the
year. Our keyword search requires the words “defer” and/or “deferred” to appear in the
“Director Compensation” sub-section of the firms’ definitive annual proxy statements. We read
all proxy statements generated through this search (approximately 5,500) to identify firms
allowing directors to voluntarily defer their annual cash retainers and meeting fees into equity in
the year and to eliminate those firms granting automatic deferred stock units to directors or
allowing directors to defer both cash and equity compensation (fewer than 3% of the firms).
This process yields an initial sample of 5,389 firm-years offering equity deferral options to
outside directors between 1999 and 2009. For this sample, we hand-collect information on

6
A 2013 survey by TheCorporateCounsel.net finds that 79% of responding firms do not make public disclosures of
insiders’ 10b5-1 trading plans, 91% allow 10b5-1 share trades during blackout periods, 77% require a one month or
shorter waiting period between the execution of a 10b5-1 plan and the time of the first equity transaction, and 82%
allow participants to voluntarily terminate a 10b5-1 plan without consequences for the insiders (see
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2013/06/survey-results-10b5-1-plan-practices-1.html ).
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specific features of the director deferral plans, as well as other director compensation
characteristics we control for in our analyses.
Table 1 provides details on the number and proportion of firms offering equity deferral
options to outside directors between 1999 and 2009. Table 1 - Panel A reports sample
compositions by year and S&P size indexes. Sample distributions indicate that the proportion of
firms offering equity deferral options has significantly increased over time and as a function of
firm size. Across the entire sample period, about 38% of the firm-years offer these options to
directors, with the proportion of firms increasing from 31% in 1999 to 43% in 2009. The
frequency of firms with equity deferral options is significantly higher among S&P500 firms,
where about 58% of the firms offer these options across all years, with a steep increase from
46% in 1999 to 63% in 2009. We observe similar, albeit less steep, trends among MidCap firms.
SmallCap and No-Index firms report a significantly lower proportion of firms offering equity
deferral options to directors (i.e., 27% across all years).
Table 1 - Panel B reports sample composition by Fama-French (1997) 12-industry
classifications and S&P500 Index. We observe significant sample variation across industries,
with the chemicals (74%), utilities (63%), manufacturing (50%), and finance (45%) sectors
reporting the highest proportion of firms offering equity deferral options to directors. 7 Industry
concentration is more pronounced among S&P500 firms, with the proportion of firms ranging
from 67% in the finance sector to 83% in the chemicals sector.

3.2. The firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options
In this section, we investigate the board and firm characteristics associated with the
firm’s likelihood of offering equity deferral options to outside directors. We first examine
whether these options are used by firms as a substitute for standard director stock option and
share grants and/or as a means to allow directors to increase their existing ownership in the firm
(e.g., Mercer Human Resource Consulting, 2003; Conference Board, 2006).

8

If equity deferral

options are used to accomplish these objectives, we expect firms with lower proportions of
director equity pay and lower outside directors’ existing ownerships in the firm to be more likely
to offer these options to directors.

9

Similarly, if equity deferrals are used by firms as tax-

7

Sample distribution across industries is relatively stable over our sample period.
Firms’ explanations for offering equity deferral options to outside directors often support these incentive-based
motivations. For example, Apogee Enterprises’ Compensation Committee Report of 2003 states: “This plan was
adopted by the Board to encourage the non-employee directors to continue to make contributions to the growth and
profits of Apogee and to increase their ownership of our common stock, thereby aligning their interests in the longterm success of Apogee with that of our other shareholders (Proxy Statement filed on May 13, 2003)”.
9
Ideally, we would also control for the existence of minimum ownership guidelines for directors, but doing so
would require hand-collecting this information from the proxy filings of all firms in the whole 1999-2009
ExecuComp-RiskMetrics intersection (not just for the firms offering equity deferral options).
8

7

advantaged alternatives to director open market purchases of the firm’s shares, we expect firms
located in states with higher marginal income personal tax rates to be more likely to offer these
options to directors. % Dir Equity Comp is the average proportion of outside directors’ annual
equity pay for the year, measured as the value of the share and option grants made to the
directors in the year divided by directors’ total pay (i.e., sum of cash retainers, meeting fees and
equity grants). Prior to 2006, ExecuComp provided the number but not the value of the stock
options and shares granted to outside directors. Consequently, for the 1999-2005 sub-period, we
estimate the value of the director equity grants based on the average price and average BlackScholes value of the shares and stock options granted to the firm’s executives during the year. %
Dir Sharesheld measures the proportion of the firm’s shares outstanding held by the firm’s
outside directors at the end of the prior year. % Income Tax Rate is the maximum personal
income tax rate of the state in which the firm is headquartered. 10
We also expect equity deferral options to be more likely offered to directors when the
proportion of outside directors on the board is higher and when the firm offers similar “cash-toequity” deferrals to corporate executives. % Outside Directors measures the proportion of firm
board members with the “dirtype” field in RiskMetrics equal to “I” (i.e., “Independent
Director”) and “L” (i.e.., “Linked Director”).

11

Option To Executives is an indicator variable

capturing whether the plan offers similar options to executives. Moreover, since equity deferral
options have features that are common to equity grant decisions, we follow prior literature on
executive equity grants (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992; Yermack, 1995;
Core and Guay, 1999) and investigate the effects of firm characteristics that have been shown to
be related to the firm’s decision to grant equity to executives. LogMVEt-1 is the logarithm of the
firm’s market value of equity at the end of year t-1. MB t-1 is the firm’s market to book value of
equity at the end of year t-1. Following prior literature, we expect larger firms and firms with
higher investment opportunities to be more likely to offer equity deferral options to directors. In
addition, since the option to defer into equity usually comes in conjunction with alternative
deferral options (discussed in Section 2) and neither requires cash payouts from the firm, we
expect firms with cash constraints to be more likely to offer these options to directors. We
follow Core and Guay (1999) and proxy for a firm’s cash constraint status with the past threeyear average of [(common and preferred dividends + cash flow used in investing activities –

10

According to U.S. state personal income tax codes, director fees are taxed based on the tax rate of the state in
which the board meetings are held, independent of whether the director resides in the state. If the director does not
reside in that state, the director must file a non-resident personal tax return and pay taxes on the earned fees. Since
most U.S. states apply source tax jurisdiction and provide a credit against the resident income tax for any nonresident tax paid in another state on the same income items, this is equivalent to the director been taxed on her fees
based on the income tax rate of the state in which the firm is headquartered.
11
Excluded from the count are board members with RiskMetrics “dirtype” field equal to “E” (i.e., “Employee”).
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cash flow from operations)/total assets] measured at the end of year t-1. Finally, we control for
the potential association between equity deferral options and firm performance by including the
firm’s past stock returns and past returns’ volatility. Stock Returnst-2,t-1 measures the firm’s
market-adjusted annualized stock returns over the prior two years. Annual returns are
constructed from compounded monthly returns. SD(Stock Returnst-2,t-1) measures the standard
deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns over the prior two years.
Table 2 presents analyses of the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to outside
directors. Table 2 - Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the hypothesized set of
determinants for the sub-sample of ExecuComp-RiskMetrics firms with available data on the
selected variables (i.e., 11,958 firm-years, consisting of 4,735 offering and 7,223 not offering
equity deferral options to directors, respectively). 12 The average firm in the sample has
approximately 81% of board members who are outsiders. Outside directors receive about 52%
of their board compensation in the form of equity, and hold about 16 basis points of the firm’s
shares outstanding at the end of the prior year. The average state’s income tax rate is about 6%.
Only 7% of the firms offer similar “cash-to-equity” deferral options to corporate executives.
Table 2 - Panel B presents univariate comparisons and results from a logit model
examining the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to outside directors in the year. The
model includes both industry and year fixed-effects and clusters z-statistics at the firm level.
Both univariate analyses and logit results indicate that the likelihood of equity deferral options
significantly increases with the firm’s board proportion of outside directors, and decreases with
both the proportion of outside directors’ equity pay and existing ownership in the firm. In terms
of marginal effects from the logit estimates, moving from the bottom to the top quartile in the
proportion of outside board members increases the likelihood of equity deferral options by about
17%. Moving from the bottom to the top quartile in the proportion of director equity pay and
proportion of shares held by the directors decreases the likelihood of equity deferral options by
about 3% and 5%, respectively. These results are consistent with the options being used as
substitutes for standard director stock option and share grants, and as a means to allow directors
to increase their ownerships in the firm. We find no evidence that the firm’s state income tax
rate affects the likelihood of deferral options being offered to directors.
Among other firm-level characteristics, the likelihood that a firm offers equity deferral
options also increases with the firm’s provision of similar options to executives, firm size, and
cash constraint status, and decreases with the firm’s past stock performance and volatility in past

12

The sample of 4,735 firm-years with equity deferral options is smaller than the original sample of 5,389 firmyears presented in Table 1, because of data unavailability on the selected set of determinants for the firm’s choice to
offer equity deferral options to outside directors used in Table 2.
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returns. Firm growth opportunities do not seem to affect the firm’s choice to offer equity
deferral options to directors. In subsequent robustness tests, we include the Inverse-Mills ratio
from the logit estimation reported in Table 2 – Panel B as an additional control in models
examining outside directors’ equity deferral choices.

4. Determinants of director equity deferrals
4.1. Director equity deferral transactions
In this section, we report summary statistics on the equity deferrals registered by sample
firms’ outside directors. We build our sample of equity deferral transactions as follows. For the
subset of 5,389 ExecuComp-RiskMetrics firm-years with equity deferral options between 1999
and 2009, we download all insider trading transactions from Thompson Insider security and
derivative filings (Tables 1 and 2, respectively). The dataset provides detailed information on
firm insiders’ trading activities as reported on Forms 3, 4, and 5 to the SEC, including the name
and identification number of each insider, three different “role-code” fields for the various
positions held at the firm (e.g., director, board committee member, officer, affiliated, beneficial
owner, and other position), transaction dates, number of shares bought or sold, and the price of
the transactions.

13

We identify equity deferrals by requiring the “sectype” and “derivative” type

fields in Thompson Insider’s tables to equal “DEFR” (i.e., Deferred Compensation) or
“PHTNM” (i.e., Phantom Stock). The “PHNTM” field is used only for those cases in which the
firm explicitly states in the annual proxy statement that the phantom stocks acquired by the
director originated from deferrals in accordance with the firm’s director deferred compensation
plan. To avoid missing transactions because of misclassifications in the insider’s role-type on
Thompson Insider, we first extract the insider’s last, middle, and first names, and then merge
these to the “last name,” “middle name,” and “first name” fields in RiskMetrics. This process
allows us to match about 97% of the insiders with Thompson Insider’s “role-codes1-3” fields
equal to “D” (i.e., “Directors”) to directors with the “dirtype” field in RiskMetrics equal to “I”
(i.e., “Independent Director”) or “L” (i.e., “Linked Director”).

14

We then require the identified

deferral transactions to have available information on the number of underlying shares and
price, and the directors to have non-missing annual compensation data and selected director
characteristics in ExecuComp and RiskMetrics. Our final sample of director equity deferrals
13

Thomson Insider records three separate date fields for each insider trade: 1) the day on which the transaction
occurred (i.e., “trandate” field); 2) the day on which the insider’s Form 4 was received in a pdf file by the SEC (i.e.,
“secdate” field); and the day on which the file was entered in the SEC’s database (i.e., “createdate” field). The field
we use in our analyses is the “trandate” field in which the deferral option was exercised (and the stock unit
recorded), since the returns the deferrals generate start from this date.
14
Eliminated from our sample are board members with “officers types” affiliation codes in any of the three “rolecodes” fields on Thompson Insider (i.e., “RoleCodes1-3” equal to ‘AV’, ‘CEO’, ‘CFO’, ‘CI’, ‘CO’, ‘CT’, ‘EVP’,
‘H’, ‘O’, ‘OB’, ‘OD’, ‘OP’, ‘OE’, ‘OS’, ‘OT’, ‘OX’, ‘P’, ‘S’, ‘SVP’, ‘VP’).
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consists of 53,015 transactions filed by 9,935 outside directors in 2,078 out of the 5,389 firmyears allowing equity deferrals.
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Figure 1 reports the average number of transactions by time of the year. The figure
shows that directors trade in each month of the year. The average (median) days between the
earliest and latest deferral transaction dates within each firm-year in the sample is 295 (321),
suggesting that sample directors were able to defer any time between January and December at
their firms, but cluster their transactions around the beginning of each quarter and the end of the
year. These patterns are consistent with those proxy statement deferral plan descriptions
allowing directors to defer based on pre-scheduled quarterly instalments and/or by the end of the
year preceding the year in which the cash will be earned. Analyses in Section 5 investigate
whether the timing of the deferrals reflect directors’ exploitation of insider information and the
use of 10b5-1 compliant deferral plans as a mechanism to conduct stealth insider trading.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the director equity deferrals in our sample. Table
3 - Panel A presents statistics on the number and proportion of outside directors filing at least
one deferral transaction in the year. Across all years, an average of six directors elected to defer
cash compensation into deferred stock units. This statistic corresponds to about 60% of the
firm’s outside directors and indicates that, in firms with at least one deferring director, a
relatively large number of directors elects to do so. Table 3 - Panel B presents statistics on the
number of transactions, the amount deferred per transaction, and the total amount deferred in the
year, expressed both in absolute value and as a proportion of the total cash compensation (i.e.,
the sum of annual retainer and meeting fees) earned by the director in the year. The dollar value
of the deferrals equals the value of the deferred stock units on the day the transactions were
filed, as reported in the “trandate” field in Thompson Insider. Sample directors registered about
six transactions per year and elected to defer an average of about $36,000 (median = $15,000)
per transaction, equivalent to an annual total deferral value of about $135,700 (median =
$75,200). Since all firms in our sample allow directors to defer a fraction up to 100% of their
annual cash retainers and fees, and to re-defer previously deferred compensation, the total
amount deferred in the year may be higher than the total cash compensation earned for that year
because of re-deferrals.

16

In these cases, we assume that the director deferred 100% of her cash

15

The remaining 3,311 firm-years are firms where no director deferred cash into equity in the year.
As mentioned in Section 2, re-deferrals are recorded as if the director receives the cash equivalents from her prior
deferrals and re-makes the choice to defer these in stock units. For example, if a director deferred a cash retainer of
$50 (equivalent to 5 stock units based on a price of $10 per share) in 2008, and in 2009 elects to re-defer the cash
equivalents generated from the deferral made in 2008 (now worth e.g., $75, at a current share price of $15) and
makes a new deferral of $30 (equivalent to 2 more stock units at the current share price of $15), the transaction will
be recorded for a total of 7 stock units (and a transaction value of $105). Directors are not required to report the
split between re-deferred and newly deferred stock units in their Forms 4.
16
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compensation for that year. Based on this assumption, deferring directors elected to defer an
average of about 82% of their annual cash compensation per year.

4.2. Contractual features
We expect several features of the director compensation contracts to affect directors’
equity deferral decisions. First, we predict director equity deferrals to depend upon the predeferral director compensation mix. If compensation mix reflects risk preferences (i.e.,
propensity towards risk), deferral values are expected to be higher for directors who have
accepted pre-deferral compensation contracts that already link a larger proportion of their annual
pay to firm stock market performance. % Equity Comp is the proportion of the director’s total
annual compensation paid in equity (i.e., full value share and stock option grants). We cannot,
however, exclude the alternative possibility that directors who already receive a larger
proportion of their pay in the form of equity may defer lower amounts because of the underdiversification effects brought about by the deferral (e.g., Ofek and Yermack, 2000; Ke et al.,
2003; Huddart and Ke, 2007). To control for the possibility that directors with higher equity
incentives also receive higher cash compensation levels that are deferrable in the year, we add a
control for the director’s annual cash compensation (i.e., sum of annual retainer and meeting
fees). Since all firms in our sample allow directors to defer a fraction up to 100% of their cash
compensation, Cash Deferrable measures the maximum amount deferrable for the year. We also
expect equity deferrals to vary with the presence of other director compensation arrangements.
As discussed earlier, firms can offer equity deferral options as a cost-effective means for
directors to reach required minimum ownership levels before the end of their mandates. To
control for this possibility, we hand-collect an additional variable from sample firms’ proxy
statements (i.e., Ownership guidelines) indicating whether the firm requires corporate directors
to reach a minimum ownership level by the end of their mandates. If equity deferrals are used by
directors to meet required ownership levels, we expect larger deferral values in the presence of
minimum ownership guidelines.
Finally, we expect director equity deferrals to vary with specific features of the director
deferral plan. As described above, the plan can offer the option to defer into alternative
investment cash accounts and/or the grant of additional stock units if the directors choose to
defer into the firm’s stock. Alternative indicates whether the plan offers the option to defer into
alternative investments. All else equal, we predict equity deferrals to decrease in the presence of
alternative (potentially less risky) investments. To control for the possibility that the equity
deferrals are driven by premiums that make the choice to defer in stock units relatively
12

“cheaper,” we control for the size of the premiums directors receive. Premium Amount measures
the proportion of deferred cash granted as a premium.
Table 4 – Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the compensation arrangements for
sample directors. Across all years, the average director earns deferrable cash compensation of
about $54,500 and receives about 49% of the total annual compensation in the form of full value
shares and/or stock option grants. About 22% of sample directors are subject to minimum
ownership guidelines, and approximately 66% of directors receive the option to invest the
deferred cash in alternative investment accounts. Premiums are rarely offered as incentives for
directors to defer into equity (only 8% across years). When offered, premiums range from 5% to
50%, with an average of 21% of the deferred cash.

4.3. Firm prospects
Studies on employee stock purchases indicate that insiders are more likely to purchase
shares in periods preceding stock market improvements (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001;
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Kallunki et al., 2009; Ravina and Sapienza, 2009). Similarly,
since the ultimate value of the deferrals will depend upon the firm’s future market performance,
we predict director equity deferrals to depend upon directors’ expectations regarding the firm’s
future prospects. We measure directors’ expectations using two different assumptions regarding
their forecasting abilities. We first assume that directors cannot predict beyond one year.
Accordingly, we measure the firm’s stock market performance over the year after the director
receives the option to defer cash into equity. Stock Returnst+1 measures the firm’s marketadjusted stock returns over the next year. We then relax this assumption and examine whether
directors formulate their deferral elections based on the expectations they may have for the
period up to the year in which they will cash in their deferred equity. Stock Returns

horizon

measures the firm’s market-adjusted annualized stock returns up to the year in which the
director will end her current directorship in the firm (i.e., the “yearend” field in RiskMetrics).
All else equal, we expect both future firm performance measures to be positively associated with
the directors’ deferred amounts. We also consider the potential signaling effect from executive
deferral behaviors. Since corporate executives in most firms are likely to have informational
advantages relative to outside directors, the directors may interpret deferrals by the firm’s
executives as informed signals of the firm’s future prospects. Thus, we predict director equity
deferrals to be positively associated with the deferrals made by corporate executives.
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We

measure executives’ deferral behavior with a dummy (i.e., Exe_Deferred) equal to one if the
17

It may also be the case that executives and directors share similar information about the firm, leading to similar
deferral choices. We find results consistent with this conjecture in robustness tests described in Section 4.6.
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firm’s CEO and/or CFO defer any compensation in the year.

18

As for the director equity

deferrals, we identify deferral transactions by CEOs and CFOs through the derivative and
security type and relationship fields in Thomson Insiders Data.
Finally, Benartzi (2001) and Choi et al. (2003) find that employees are more likely to
invest their saving plan contributions in their firms’ stock following periods of good stock
market performance. In contrast, empirical studies indicate that insider traders are contrarian
investors who buy firm stock when past returns have been lower (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone
2005; Jenter 2005; Ravina and Sapienza 2009; Lakonishok and Lee 2001). We therefore
examine the influence of firm past performance by including the firm’s market-adjusted
annualized stock returns over the prior two years (i.e., Stock Returnst-2,t-1).
Table 4 – Panel B reports descriptive statistics on the executive deferrals and stock
performance variables. Across all years, about 9% of the firm’s CEOs and/or CFOs registered at
least one deferral transaction. The average firm’s market-adjusted stock returns over the next
year are about 9.2%, and approximately 9.4% over the period up to the year the director’s
current mandate concludes. Finally, sample firms report mean past market-adjusted stock returns
of about 8.6% over the prior two years.

4.4. Personal characteristics
In addition to firm-level factors such as the contractual features of the director
compensation plans and future firm performance, we expect several personal characteristics to
affect directors’ equity deferral choices. We capture three sets of director-specific characteristics
at the time the deferral options are offered. The first set includes proxies for the directors’
existing ownership and professional profile inside the firm. First, we expect outside directors
who already have a significant fraction of their wealth invested in the firm to defer lower
amounts into equity because of under-diversification concerns. Consistent with this hypothesis,
related research on insider trading finds that employees are less likely to buy firm shares when
they already hold large stock holdings in the firm (e.g., Ke et al., 2003; Huddart el al., 2007;
Huddart and Ke, 2007; Kallunki et al., 2009). % Sharesheld measures the proportion of the
firm’s common shares outstanding owned by the director at the end of the prior year. Moreover,
if directors use the equity deferrals as an alternative to open market purchases of the company’s
stock, we expect equity deferral values to be negatively associated with the presence of director
open market purchases. Acquisition indicates whether the director registers open market
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As noted earlier, executive deferred compensation plans usually allow the executives to defer both cash and
equity pay into equity. Since public disclosures do not allow disentangling the proportion of cash compensation that
is deferred, the registered transactions by CEOs and CFOs can represent a combination of equity and cash deferrals.
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purchases of the firm’s common stock in the year.

19

We also add a control for whether the

director already meets the firm’s ownership guidelines (if any are in place). Met Guidelines
equals one if the number of shares held by the director is equal to or larger than the minimum
number of shares required by the guidelines.

20

If directors use equity deferrals to meet

ownership guidelines, we expect directors who already meet the required ownership levels to
defer less into equity. Finally, we add two controls for the director’s past and future horizon in
the firm, because directors can usually further defer previously deferred compensation and
access the deferred compensation upon termination of directorship on the board. Tenure
measures the number of directorship years at the firm. Horizon measures the number of years
until the termination of current directorship, measured as the difference between the year in
which the director ends her current board mandate and the current year.
The second set of measures includes two proxies for the director’s wealth diversification
status. Other Boards is the number of other boards the director serves on. Executive indicates
whether the director is an executive (i.e., CEO and/or CFO) in another firm. All else equal, we
predict outside directors who hold more diversified portfolios (i.e., directors sitting on multiple
boards and executives in other firms) to be more willing to defer into the firm’s equity. Finally,
prior studies on the allocation of retirement funds and insider purchases indicate that these
decisions are significantly associated with the insider’s age and gender (e.g., Eaton and Rosen,
1983; Choi et al., 2003). To examine these associations in our setting, we include two additional
variables capturing these director attributes in our models.
Table 4 – Panel C reports descriptive statistics on director personal characteristics.
Sample directors report average ownership levels of about 0.16 basis points. About 9% of
directors make open market purchase of the company’s stock in the year, and 71% already meet
the required minimum ownership levels (if any are in place). Sample directors have an average
directorship tenure in the firm of about eight years and a directorship horizon of almost two
years before current service termination. In terms of wealth diversification, sample directors
serve on at least one other board and 18% are executives in other firms. Average director age is
61 years and 15% of sample directors are females.
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We identify directors’ open market purchases by requiring the “trancode” field in Thompson Insider to equal “P”
and the “sectype” or “derivative” fields to equal “ORD” (i.e., Ordinary Shares) and “COM” (i.e., Common Stock).
20
Among the 1,715 plans with reported ownership guidelines for directors, 337 plans specify the required
ownership levels as the minimum number of shares the directors must hold, while the remaining 1,378 plans
specify the required levels in dollar values or as a multiple of the annual cash retainer. The Met Guidelines variable
for these firms is computed by converting the minimum required ownership levels from dollar values to shares
equivalents (by dividing the dollar value of the guidelines by the firm’s year-end closing price) and comparing
these amounts with the number of shares held by directors at the end of the year.
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4.5. Univariate results
Table 5 reports mean comparison tests between the sub-samples of directors who elected
to defer (at least some) cash compensation into equity between 1999 and 2009 (i.e., 9,935
deferring director-years) and all other directors who received similar equity deferral options but
did not exercise them (i.e., 31,360 non-deferring director-years). A number of significant
differences emerge. Deferring directors receive higher average cash compensation ($57,000 vs.
$53,700) and higher proportions of total equity pay (51% vs. 49%) compared to non-deferring
directors. Deferring directors are also more likely to be subject to ownership guidelines (25% vs.
21%) and to receive premiums for deferrals made into equity (12% vs. 7%). On the other hand,
the two groups do not differ significantly in their likelihood of receiving the option to defer into
alternative investment accounts. Deferral likelihood also varies with the firm’s past performance
and the expectations directors may have regarding the firm’s future prospects. Directors are
more likely to defer in years in which the firm’s CEO and/or CFO elect to defer into equity
(20% vs. 6%). Consistent with contrarian strategies, directors are more likely to defer in years
following poor performance and preceding significant stock price improvements.
Deferring and non-deferring directors also differ significantly in many personal
characteristics. Consistent with diversification arguments, deferring directors, on average, hold
smaller proportions of the firm’s common shares outstanding (0.11% vs. 0.18%), are less likely
to already meet required ownership levels (68% vs. 73%), and less likely to perform open
market purchases of the company’s stock during the year (8% vs. 9%). Deferring directors sit on
a larger number of other boards (1.3 vs. 1.1 boards) and are more likely to be executives in other
firms (21% vs. 17%). Deferring directors also tend to have shorter tenures in the firm (7.8 vs.
8.1 years) and shorter horizons before the end of their current service on the board (1.7 vs. 1.8
years). We find no significant differences in age and gender across the two groups.
We find similar results in untabulated analyses that compare two sub-samples of
directors who always defer and directors who never defer in the years when they receive the
option to. Out of the 41,295 director-firm-years in our sample, 3,463 observations pertain to
directors who always defer and 24,589 pertain to directors who never defer. The remaining
13,243 observations relate to directors who defer at least once over their directorship at the firm.
One advantage from including all three sub-samples of “always,” “at-least-once,” and “never”
deferring directors in our analyses is to exploit the within- and across- directors variation in
personal and firm characteristics, such as time-varying features that might drive the directors to
elect to defer in some firm-years but not others.
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4.6. Multivariate results: overall sample
We investigate the determinants of director equity deferrals in Table 6. The table reports
results from OLS models examining the total dollar amounts the director deferred for the
year.
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We compute the total deferred values as the sum of the values of all equity deferral

transactions the director recorded in the year. By construction, equity deferral values are set to
zero for directors not reporting equity deferral transactions in the year. The model in Column I
regresses the value of the directors’ equity deferrals on our set of hypothesized determinants
plus firm fixed-effects. We include firm fixed-effects to control for time-invariant firm
characteristics and provide tests for differences in director-level characteristics across directors
serving the same firm and facing the same institutional environment. Column II replicates the
model after including the Inverse-Mills ratio from the logit estimates in Table 2 – Panel B for
the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors. We report these results to mitigate
concerns about omitted firm characteristics driving both the existence of equity deferral options
and directors’ deferral elections.
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To control for autocorrelation in the errors, regression

coefficients are estimated by clustering standard errors by the directors’ personal identification
numbers (i.e., the “did” field in RiskMetrics). All models include controls for the logarithm of
the firm’s market value of equity, the firm’s market-to-book ratio, and the standard deviation of
the firm’s stock returns over the prior two years to control for differences in size, growth
opportunities and stock volatility across firms.
Results across both columns indicate that director equity deferrals are significantly
associated with features of the director compensation plan. Controlling for the level of cash
deferrable for the year and the size of the premiums for deferrals made into equity, equity
deferral values are positively associated with the pre-deferral director compensation delivered in
equity. This result supports the hypothesis that the perceived under-diversification costs brought
about by the deferrals are lower for directors already committed to compensation contracts with
higher equity incentives. The presence of ownership guidelines and alternative cash investment
options are only weakly associated with the deferred amounts.
Consistent with information arguments, we find strong evidence that directors condition
their deferral decisions based on expectations they may have regarding the firm’s future stock
market performance. Directors defer larger amounts in years in which the firm’s CEO and/or
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We reach similar conclusions when we estimate tobit modes for the percent of the annual cash that was deferred
and when we replace the dollar deferred amounts with a dummy for the director’s choice to defer at least part of the
annual cash pay into equity in logit models. Together, these results are consistent with the statistics presented in
Table 3 suggesting that, when electing to defer, deferring directors choose to convert relatively large amounts of the
deferrable cash into stock.
22
We acknowledge that this can only be a partial correction for selection since we are missing an exogenous
instrument in our logit estimates for the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors.
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CFO defer compensation into equity. A significant positive association also emerges between
equity deferral values and the firm’s market-adjusted returns over the period until the director
becomes eligible to cash in the equity values of the deferrals. Results are similar if we replace
the director-specific Stock Returns horizon variable with the (more generic) variable measuring the
firm’s market adjusted returns over the next year (i.e., Stock Returns

t+1).

These results support

the conjecture that, at the time they make their elections, directors believe their firms will realize
significant stock market performance improvements, and that such improvements will last until
they will become eligible to cash in the equity.
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Finally, the coefficients on the firm’s past

returns are negative and significant. This evidence suggests that, consistent with contrarian
strategies, directors defer larger amounts after years of lower returns.
Moreover, the fact that the existence of executive deferrals in the year remain significant
after controlling for future firm performance suggests that the deferrals by firm executives
capture some additional information the directors rely upon when making their deferral
elections. In untabulated tests, we investigate whether this result is driven by the possibility that
executives and directors share a similar information set about the firm’s future prospects
(leading to similar deferral choices), rather than simply mimicking the executives. For this
purpose, we replace the Exe_Deferred variable with an alternative indicator variable capturing
whether the executive deferrals occurred any time before the director’s deferrals. The variable
measures whether the earliest deferral transaction registered by the firm’s CEO and/or CFO
occurred any time in the year before the earliest deferral transaction registered by the director.
When we use this alternative measure in our models, the variable is no longer associated with
the directors’ equity deferrals. This result suggests that executive and directors share similar
information about the firm (and defer accordingly), rather than directors simply mimicking prior
deferrals made by the firm’s executives because of some form of information disadvantage.
Proxies for the directors’ ownership profiles inside the firm and wealth diversification
status are also significant predictors. Consistent with portfolio diversification arguments,
deferral values are negatively associated with the director’s existing ownership levels in the firm
and positively associated with proxies for the director’s outside wealth diversification (i.e.,
number of other boards and whether the director is an executive elsewhere). Likely due to redeferrals, deferral values are positively associated with the director’s board tenure in the firm,
but not significantly associated with the number of years remaining before the end of the

23
We find similar results over a sub-sample of deferring directors with directorship horizons longer than one year
in classified boards. Average (median) directorship horizon for these directors is 2.61 (3) years. In untabulated
analyses we find that, for this sub-sample of deferring directors, the buy-and-hold Stock Returnshorizon are higher
than the firm’s one-year ahead returns, consistent with the directors conditioning their deferral choices upon their
expectations on the firm’s stock market performance over their remaining directorship at the firm.
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director’s current mandate. We observe no significant age effects, but find that female directors,
on average, defer lower amounts compared to male directors. All results are robust if we restrict
the sample to firms with at least one deferring director in the year.

4.7. Sub-sample of multiple-board directors
One potential concern with our analyses is the existence of some unobservable director
personal characteristics that are likely associated with equity deferral choices but are not
adequately captured in our models, such as the directors’ outside wealth and/or relative risk
aversion. To moderate concerns about the effects of such omitted characteristics, we test our
models over a sub-sample of directors who serve on multiple firms offering equity deferral
options between 1999 and 2009. This sub-sample is a particularly powerful setting for our
analyses because those unobservable characteristics likely associated with deferral choices are
held constant across all boards the director serves on in a given year. Moreover, since multipleboard directors may elect to defer in some firms but not in others, the sub-sample provides a
quasi-experimental setting to assess the effects of the various contractual and firm
characteristics we expect to impact the decision to defer, such as the information the directors
may have regarding the firm’s future performance.
We identify our sub-sample of multiple-board directors based on the directors’
identification numbers in RiskMetrics, and flag cases of multiple-directorship if a director
appears in more than one firm in a given year. The sample of multiple-board directors includes
3,341 distinct directors (about 41% of directors in the sample) serving on more than one board
between 1999 and 2009. The average director sits on 2.7 distinct boards in a year and elects to
defer in only 27% of the boards (5,450 deferring vs. 14,651 non-deferring director-firm-years).
Table 7 replicates the analyses in Table 6 using the sub-sample of directors who serve on
multiple firms offering equity deferral options between 1999 and 2009. We continue to find that
the equity deferrals are positively associated with the proportion of the pre-deferral director
compensation paid in equity. Deferred amounts are larger when directors have longer tenure
(because of re-deferrals) and smaller when directors already own a significant fraction of the
firm’s shares. Multiple-board directors who are executives elsewhere also defer larger amounts.
The opposite remains true for female directors. Most importantly for our study, we continue to
find strong evidence that directors condition their deferral elections on their expectations
regarding future firm performance. Multiple-board directors defer larger amounts in years in
which the firm’s executives defer into equity and in years preceding significant stock market
improvements. Analyses in Section 5 address whether these directors used the deferrals to trade
19

upon private information by comparing the abnormal returns these directors realize from their
deferrals to the returns they would have realized in those firms where they elect not to defer.

4.8. Sub-sample of executive directors
For some outside directors, the payments for board services may be so small relative to
their outside wealth that the equity deferrals may become relatively irrelevant choices. This is
expected to be particularly true for directors who are executives at other firms. To further
address concerns about the economic relevance of the deferrals relative to the directors’
unobservable outside wealth, we exploit the sub-sample of directors who are executive at other
firms (i.e., 7,514 director-firm-years, 2,094 deferring and 5,420 non-deferring observations) to
collect information about their annual compensation at their primary employers.
One field in RiskMetrics (i.e., the “priemp” field) provides the names of outside
directors’ main employers. We manually match the company names in this field to the
“coname” field on ExecuComp to retrieve compensation data for the executive directors in our
sample. We next match the directors’ first and last names as reported in RiskMetrics to the
executive’s first and last names in ExecuComp. One potential limitation to this matching is that
a director must be one of the five highest-paid executives in the firm in order to appear in
ExecuComp. The process yields annual salary and total compensation data (i.e., sum of salary,
other short-term compensation components, value of the restricted shares and stock option
grants and any other annual pay) for 1,198 deferring and 2,833 non-deferring director-firmyears, corresponding to a relatively representative 57% and 52% of the deferring and nondeferring director observations in our original executive directors’ sample.
We conduct two additional analyses with these data. First, we compute the value of the
directors’ deferrals as a proportion of their annual salary and total compensation at their primary
employers. Untabulated statistics indicate that the equity deferrals registered by executive
directors in a year represent about 23% of the salary and 6% of the total compensation these
directors received at their primary employers in that year. Since S&P1500 executives most
likely represent the wealthiest group of outside directors in our sample,
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these findings

moderate concerns that the deferrals represent insignificant economic amounts and proportions
of the directors’ annual wealth. Second, we re-estimate our models using the sub-sample of
executive directors with available salary and total annual compensation amounts (i.e., 4,031
director-firm-years). In untabulated models that control for the annual salary or total
24

Average (median) salary and total pay levels for sample executive directors with available compensation data on
ExecuComp are about $800,000 ($817,000) and $6,200,000 ($4,500,000), respectively. Both amounts are
significantly higher than those reported by the average executive in ExecuComp over our sample period, primarily
because our sample of executive directors mostly includes CEOs and CFOs at S&P 500 firms.
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compensation (in separate specifications), we continue to find significant associations between
the deferrals and variables capturing: a) whether the firm’s executives engaged in similar
transactions; b) the firm’s future stock market performance; and c) the director’s existing
ownership in the firm. Interestingly, premium amounts still act as strong predictors of the equity
deferrals made by this sub-sample of wealthier directors.
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5. Trading performance of director equity deferrals
5.1. Abnormal returns
In this section, we investigate the trading performance of sample directors’ equity
deferrals. Using an approach similar to Ravina and Sapienza (2009), we measure the level of
insider information outside directors exploit through their deferrals by computing the cumulative
abnormal returns the directors realize from these transactions. Table 8 reports results for
cumulated abnormal returns measured at various horizons. RET(t+60), RET(t+180), and
RET(t+360) are the buy-and-hold returns over the +60, +180, and +360 days following the
equity deferral transactions dates, respectively. RET(horizon) cumulates returns between the
equity deferral transaction dates and the end of the year in which the director’s current mandate
ends. RET(final) cumulates returns between the equity deferral transaction dates and the end of
the year in which the director’s last mandate at the firm ends. We estimate two abnormal return
measures. Market-adjusted returns are the difference between the firm’s stock returns and the
market returns, where the S&P500 Index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio.
Benchmark-adjusted returns are the difference between the firm’s stock returns and the returns
predicted by the size, book-to-market, and momentum model as in Daniel et al. (1997).
Across all measurement windows and estimation methods, deferring directors exhibit
significant abnormal returns from their equity deferrals. Average market-adjusted (benchmarkadjusted) returns for the overall sample equal 2.5% (0.5%), 7% (1.2%), and 13.7% (1.6%) over
the +60, +180, and +360 days following the deferral transaction dates, respectively. All returns
are statistically different from zero and remain significantly positive at longer horizons.
Multiple-board directors electing to defer in some firms but not others realize market-adjusted
returns that are similar to the overall sample, but benchmark-adjusted returns that are
significantly higher at longer horizons. 26
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The significant effect from available premiums is consistent with Adams and Ferreira’s (2008) finding that
outside board members respond to the very small monetary incentives provided by board meeting attendance fees.
26
The long-window returns associated with director equity deferrals are consistent to those found in other studies.
Ravina and Sapienza (2009) investigate and find significant returns over horizons up to +180 days. In a more recent
paper, Cao et al. (2015) also finds that directors who are socially connected to the firm’s executives realize
significant returns over 180 day windows. These results suggest that the market does not fully impound the
information contained in outside directors’ insider trading filings, even over relatively long windows.
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To investigate whether directors realize abnormal returns based on insider information,
we next compare the returns deferring directors realize from their deferrals to the returns nondeferring directors would have realized if they had exercised their deferral options at their firms.
If directors’ deferral decisions are based on insider information regarding the firm’s future
prospects, we expect the returns to be significantly larger for deferring directors. Alternatively,
if deferral decisions reflect factors other than insider information, we should see no significant
differences in subsequent returns across the deferring and non-deferring groups. One issue with
this analysis is choosing a date on which non-deferring directors would have deferred in those
firms in which they decide not to. Table 8 - Panel A compares the abnormal returns of sample
directors’ equity deferrals to the returns non-deferring directors would have realized if they had
exercised their options on the firm’s annual board meeting date. We use the annual board
meeting date because this is the date newly-elected directors can exercise their first deferral
options and is likely to be a period when board members receive substantial insider information
to trade upon. Results, however, are similar if we assume that non-deferring directors would
have deferred before the beginning of the year, which corresponds to the spike in deferral dates
as reported in Figure 1. Across both market- and benchmark-adjusted abnormal return measures,
deferring directors realize significantly higher returns at all horizons. These results suggest that
the returns deferring directors earn from their transactions are the result of directors conditioning
their deferrals based on some form of insider information. 27
Table 8 - Panel B replicates the analyses using the sub-sample of multiple-board
directors electing to defer in some firms but not in others, thereby controlling for director
effects. For this sub-sample, we compare the abnormal returns these directors realize from their
deferrals to the returns they would have realized if they had exercised their equity deferral
options at other firms. Similar to the analyses in Table 8 – Panel A, we assume that the deferrals
would have occurred on the annual board meeting dates of those firms where the directors do
not exercise their deferral options. Across both abnormal return measures, the multiple-board
directors realize significantly higher returns when they elect to defer, compared to when they do
not. The results are qualitatively similar if we assume that the directors would have deferred in
the non-deferring firms before the beginning of the year. The results from the multiple-board
sub-sample provide further support for the argument that sample directors used their deferral
transactions to exploit insider information.
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Consistent with these arguments, in untabulated tests examining director turnovers, we find that deferring
directors tend to leave their firms in years preceding significant stock price declines. This result is robust across
both abnormal returns measures.
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5.2. Cross-sectional variation in returns
In this section, we investigate various factors potentially associated with the magnitude
of the abnormal returns directors realize from their deferral transactions. We estimate the effect
of two sets of variables. The first set of measures is aimed at capturing variation in directors’
ability to acquire (and trade upon) relevant information about the firm. These variables include
measures for the firm’s overall governance quality and information environment, as well as
other mechanisms that previous studies have shown to affect outside directors’ information
access and monitoring abilities, such as the proportion of insiders on the board, board size,
committee memberships and attendance at board meetings. We measure a firm’s governance
quality based on the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Governance Index, and categorize a
firm as having weak governance if the index falls into the top quartile of sample distribution.
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We measure a firm’s information environment by the number of analysts following the firm and
the number of forecasts issued by the firm’s executives in the year. Higher quality governance
firms may have better mechanisms in place that allow the market to receive timely information
about the firm. Similarly, higher analyst coverage and frequency of management forecasts may
translate in smaller information gaps between firm insiders and the market. As a consequence,
we expect outside directors to be better able to exploit relevant private information when the
firm has weaker governance, less analysts following and less frequent management forecasts.
We also expect directors’ information access to be facilitated when the proportion of insiders on
the board is higher. Moreover, if the level and type of outside director involvement in board
activities influence information acquisition, returns may vary with the directors’ attendance
records and type of committee memberships.
The second set of variables is used to test whether the realized returns also vary with
specific features of the director deferral plan, and whether directors use the equity deferrals as a
tax-advantaged substitute for open-market purchases of the company’s stock. We expect
directors to require lower returns from their deferrals when the deferral plans have features, such
as premiums, that make the deferrals relatively cheaper, and/or when other contractual
contingencies make these transactions relatively less discretionary, such as the existence of
minimum ownership guidelines for directors. Across all sample firms and years, deferring
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The Governance Index by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) measures a firm’s governance quality by counting
the number of governance provisions a firm has that restrict shareholder rights. More governance provisions, and
thus a higher Governance Index, proxy for weaker governance. The original list of governance provisions in the
Governance Index included 24 distinct items. Since 2007, RiskMetrics only collects a subset of these provisions. In
order to compute a governance quality proxy valid across all years in our sample, we calculate the index by
restricting the count to those provisions available in both the pre- and post- 2006 RiskMetrics files. The index
computed using this sub-set of provisions has a correlation of about 85% with the index computed using all 24 of
the original provisions. Our results in Table 9 remain highly significant if we restrict the analyses to the 1999-2006
sub-period with available data to compute the index based on all 24 original provisions.
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directors made only 1,967 open market purchases compared to 8,124 by non-deferring directors.
These numbers suggest that deferring directors used the deferrals as a substitute for open market
purchases. If directors use the deferrals as an alternative purchase mechanism purely because of
tax benefits, we expect the returns to be significantly lower in the presence of higher personal
income tax rates (since the tax savings from the deferrals would make the after-tax returns
higher). If, on the other hand, directors use the deferrals for reasons other than tax advantages,
we expect no association between the returns and the size of the tax savings.
Table 9 provides results from these analyses. Panel A (Panel B) reports results
examining cumulated market-adjusted (benchmark-adjusted) returns at +60, +180, and +360
days following the equity deferral transaction dates, as well as for the period up to the end of the
director’s current mandate (RET(horizon)). We estimate all models including firm fixed-effects,
clustering standard errors at the director level, and controlling for the size of the transactions.
Across most measurement windows and estimation methods, the abnormal returns directors
realize from the deferrals are higher in firms with weaker governance, smaller boards, and
boards with higher proportions of insiders, and lower in firms with higher analyst coverage and
more frequent management forecasts. These results provide strong evidence that directors earn
larger returns in settings where their ability to acquire and trade upon insider information is
higher. We find no evidence that committee memberships or directors’ attendance records are
significantly associated with the returns. We also find that, at longer horizons, the abnormal
returns are negatively associated with the size of the premiums and the existence of minimum
ownership guidelines for directors. With one exception (market-adjusted RET(horizon)), returns
do not vary significantly with the personal tax rates. Together, these results suggest that, aside
from information reasons, the returns do also vary with director compensation plan features. We
find no evidence that sample directors used the deferrals as an alternative to open-market
purchases because of tax benefits.

5.3. Opportunistic timing
To further address the factors contributing to the abnormal returns deferring directors
realize from their transactions, in this section we investigate whether the equity deferrals were
timed opportunistically. We first look at whether the deferrals were backdated. Following the
approach in Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007), we first examine the reporting gaps between
the “trandate” (the date of the transaction) and “secdate” (the date in which the director’s Form
4 was submitted to the SEC) fields in Thompson Insider. Untabulated statistics indicate that the
average (median) number of trading days between the two dates is 29 (2). About 73% of the
deferrals were reported to the SEC within five trading days of the transactions, with about 64%
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reported within two days. The reporting gaps are much smaller after August 29, 2002, when the
SEC changed the reporting regulation for Forms 4 filings.
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Average (median) trading days

between the “trandate” and “secdate” fields for deferral transactions occurring after the new
regulation are 7 (2), with about 83% of the deferrals reported within two days. Heron and Lie
(2007) find similar patterns in reporting gaps for their sample of executive stock option grants
before and after the new regulation. When we plot the cumulative daily abnormal returns over
the (-30, +360) period around the deferral transaction dates (see Figure 2), the returns do not
show the typical V-shape patterns associated with backdating, with negative abnormal returns
before the transactions and positive abnormal returns afterward. These results provide no
evidence of backdating in our sample of director equity deferrals.
We next investigate whether the returns deferring directors realize come from strategic
timing of the deferral transactions during periods when open market purchases of the firm’s
shares would violate Rule 10b5 trading restrictions. As described in Section 2, Rule 10b5-1
creates a “safe harbor” in which directors, through the adoption of a pre-planned, 10b5-1
compliant deferral plan, can trade a company’s securities even during periods when they possess
material non-public information. Various loopholes in the rule, including the ability to cancel
pre-planned deferrals on short notice and without penalties, provide directors with the
opportunity to exploit insider information while remaining under the protection of 10b5-1. Since
the firms in our sample allow for both pre-scheduled and unscheduled deferrals (which are still
subject to blackout trading restrictions), the finding that a significant fraction of the transactions
occurs during blackout periods would provide evidence that sample directors effectively used
10b5-1 compliant deferral plans as a mechanism to conduct stealth insider trading.
We follow Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) and define the -47 to +2 trading days
relative to quarterly earnings announcements as blackout days and the +3 to +12 trading days as
non-blackout days. To investigate the use of the equity deferrals as an alternative mechanism to
conduct stealth insider trading, we calculate average transaction sizes and values of the
directors’ equity deferrals and open market purchases during blackout and non-blackout periods,
respectively. Results from these analyses are reported in Table 10 and Figure 3. The reported
number of transactions during blackout and non-blackout periods indicates that about 66% of
the director equity deferrals in our sample fall within the -47 to +2 days around quarterly
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In response to changes to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 mandated by the SarbanesOxley Act, the new regulation requires Forms 4 to be filed before the end of the second business day following the
day of a transaction resulting in a change in beneficial ownership. This category includes stock option grants,
restricted stock grants and acquisitions of stock units under non-tax qualified deferred compensation or other
dividend and interest reinvestment plans (see https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-46421.htm). However, the SEC
has adopted special limited deferred reporting rules (up to five business days depending upon circumstances) for
10b5-1 transactions, including deferred compensation plan investments that fall within the scope of 10b5-1 plans.
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earnings announcement dates. Table 10 - Panel A compares the trading sizes and values of the
equity deferrals and open market purchases by all outside directors in our sample. Table 10 Panel B replicates the comparisons over the sub-sample of firms with at least one deferring
director in the year. Although we observe significant decreases in average transaction sizes for
both types of transactions during blackout windows, the average transaction size of equity
deferrals is substantially higher than that of open market purchases during black-out days. We
observe similar patterns in transaction values. The average deferral (open purchase) transaction
value declines from $20,302 ($30,101) during non-blackout days to $15,691 ($8,203) in
blackout days across all firms. These results are stronger in the sub-sample of firms with at least
one deferring director, where the average deferral transaction size is about 85 basis points
compared to an average size of 12 basis points for open market purchases, with a peak at 17
trading days before the quarterly earnings announcement. For this sub-sample, the average
deferral (open purchase) transaction value decreases from $42,769 ($17,659) during nonblackout days to $31,360 ($4,606) in blackout periods. Overall, these findings indicate that
outside directors use equity deferrals as an alternative purchase mechanism during blackout
periods, and that the returns deferring directors realize come, for a significant fraction of the
transactions, from the exploitation of material insider information before quarterly earnings
announcements. This evidence is consistent with ongoing SEC concerns that directors may be
using deferral plans set in accordance with 10b5-1 to circumvent blackout period trading
restrictions.

6. Summary and conclusions
This study investigates the determinants and trading performance of outside directors’
equity deferrals, which represent the choice to convert part or all of their annual cash
compensation into deferred company stock. We examine director equity deferrals using a handcollected sample of S&P1500 firms that allowed outside board members to defer their cash
compensation into equity between 1999 and 2009. We first investigate the factors influencing a
firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors. Results indicate that the options are
used by larger firms as a substitute for standard director stock option and share grants and as a
means to allow directors to increase their existing ownership in the firm. We next focus on the
determinants and trading performance of director equity deferrals. Our evidence that directors
condition their deferrals based on future stock market performance, that directors on multiple
boards selectively choose where to defer, and that the equity deferrals generate significant
abnormal returns, suggest that directors can use the deferral transactions to trade upon material
insider information. Although prior studies find that independent directors earn abnormal returns
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when purchasing their company’s stock, they provide no evidence on how directors can
circumvent SEC Rule 10b-5 when making informed trades. Our blackout results provide strong
evidence that outside directors can use 10b5-1 deferral plans to conduct stealth insider trading.
Our study leaves open two issues. First, since the deferred amounts can still represent a
fairly small proportion of most directors’ total outside wealth, our results raise the question
about why directors would risk violating SEC rules with these transactions. The availability of
Rule 10b5-1’s defence against insider information claims provides one explanation, but future
studies can shed additional light on the firm’s and contractual conditions influencing directors’
insider trading incentives. Second, consistent with other studies on outside directors’ trades, we
find that the market does not fully impound the information content of director equity deferrals,
even at longer horizons. These issues remain questions for future research.
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Appendix
Proxy statement descriptions of the deferred plans for outside directors
From H&R Block’s 2001 Proxy Statement:
“In accordance with the provisions of the H&R Block Deferred Compensation Plan for Directors,
eligible non-employee directors may defer receipt of their cash retainers and/or meeting fees. Gain and
losses are posted to each director account in accordance with the participant’s election among a fixed
rate, variable rate and Company common stock investment alternatives. Units credited to a stock account
are based upon the amount deferred and the market price of Company’s stock. The value of each stock
account at the time of the distribution will be based on the market value of the stock at that time.”
(Definitive Proxy Statement filed on 30th July, 2001).
From Supervalu Inc.’s 2003 Proxy Statement:
“Directors may elect to defer payment of their directors’ fees under one or more of the following
arrangements: 1) Directors Deferred Compensation Plan and Executive Deferred Compensation Plan.
Fees and quarterly interest are credited to an account for the director, until payment is made from the
plan following retirement from the Board. 2) Non-Employee Directors Deferred Stock Plan. This plan is
designed to encourage increased stock ownership among directors. Under the plan, a director may elect
to have payment of all or a portion of the directors’ fees deferred and credited to a deferred stock
account. The Company then credits the director’s account with an additional amount equal to 10% of the
amount of fees the director has elected to defer and contributes the total amounts in the director’s account
to an irrevocable trust, that use the amounts to purchase shares of the Company common stock. […] The
common stock in each director’s deferred stock account will be distributed to the director after the
director leaves the Board. Until that time, the trust assets remain subject to the claims of our creditors”.
(Definitive Proxy Statement filed on 5th May, 2003).
From First Community Bank’s 2005 Proxy Statement:
“The Company has adopted a Directors’ Deferred Compensation Plan, or the Deferred Plan, that allows
all directors of the Company and its subsidiaries, to elect by written notice to defer payment of all or a
portion of their directors’ fees, for the next succeeding calendar year into the Deferred Plan. The
Deferred Plan permits participants to elect to have deferred amounts invested in a money market account
or common stock of the Company. The Deferred Plan has been designed to comply with Rule 10b5-1 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Participation in the Deferred Plan is voluntary and
participants may change their elections annually, or otherwise as permitted by the Deferred Plan.”
(Definitive Proxy Statement filed on 16th March, 2005).
From Paxair Inc.’s 2008 Proxy Statement:
“Under the Directors' Fees Deferral Plan, non-management directors may, before the beginning of a
calendar year, elect to defer to a later date payment of some or all of the cash fees that may be earned in
the upcoming year. A director fixes this deferred payment date when he or she makes his or her deferral
election. A director also chooses whether the deferred fees will earn amounts based upon a "Cash
Account", or a "Stock Unit Account." The Cash Account earns interest at the prime rate, while the value
of the Stock Unit Account tracks the market price of the Company's common stock. Stock units provide
directors the economic equivalent of owning the Company's stock, except that the units may not be
transferred or sold and they do not provide any voting or other shareholder rights. The "Cash Account" is
paid to the director in cash on the designated payment date. The "Stock Unit Account" is paid in shares
of Company common stock.” (Definitive Proxy Statement filed on 14th March, 2008).
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Table 1: Firms offering equity deferral options to outside directors
(ExecuComp-RiskMetrics 1999-2009)
The table presents the proportion of firms in the ExecuComp-Riskmetrics intersection over the period 1999-2009
(14,017 firm-years) offering to outside directors the option to defer cash compensation into equity in the year. Panel
A reports the number and proportion of firms offering equity deferral options by year and S&P Index (i.e., S&P500,
MidCap, SmallCap & No Index). Panel B reports the number and proportion of firms offering equity deferral
options by Fama-French (1997) 12-industry classifications and S&P500 Index.

Panel A: By Year and S&P Index
Overall Sample

S&P500

MidCap

SmallCap/No-Index

Year

N

(%)

N

(%)

N

(%)

N

(%)

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

386
427
465
492
513
513
520
528
465
529
551

(30.5%)
(33.0%)
(33.9%)
(37.8%)
(39.4%)
(39.9%)
(40.7%)
(42.5%)
(40.6%)
(42.0%)
(43.1%)

162
182
193
208
230
235
239
255
210
255
277

(46.1%)
(50.0%)
(51.3%)
(57.3%)
(60.2%)
(60.7%)
(60.5%)
(62.3%)
(60.2%)
(61.6%)
(63.1%)

61
71
72
89
95
97
104
114
111
127
137

(30.8%)
(32.3%)
(30.5%)
(37.9%)
(37.2%)
(36.5%)
(37.5%)
(40.6%)
(38.0%)
(39.4%)
(39.4%)

163
174
200
195
188
181
177
159
144
147
137

(22.7%)
(24.6%)
(26.3%)
(27.7%)
(28.2%)
(28.7%)
(29.3%)
(28.9%)
(28.6%)
(28.0%)
(28.0%)

5,389

(38.4%)

2,446

(57.8%)

1,078

(36.9%)

1,865

(27.2%)

All Years

Panel B: By Industry & S&P500 Index
Overall Sample

Industry
Non-Durable Consumer
Durable Consumer
Manufacturing
Energy
Chemicals
Business Equipment
Telecommunications
Utilities
Wholesale/Retail
Healthcare
Finance
Other
All Industries

S&P500

All Other Firms

N

(%)

N

(%)

N

(%)

371
130
919
169
352
531
94
520
588
300
937
478

(41.4%)
(36.8%)
(49.8%)
(30.5%)
(74.1%)
(21.9%)
(37.4%)
(63.4%)
(35.1%)
(27.9%)
(45.0%)
(30.6%)

178
38
340
117
133
286
59
272
247
181
405
190

(59.3%)
(59.4%)
(70.7%)
(44.5%)
(83.1%)
(41.3%)
(55.7%)
(78.2%)
(51.5%)
(54.7%)
(66.8%)
(47.9%)

193
92
579
52
219
245
35
248
341
119
532
288

(32.4%)
(31.8%)
(42.4%)
(17.9%)
(69.5%)
(14.1%)
(24.1%)
(52.5%)
(28.5%)
(16.0%)
(36.1%)
(24.7%)

5,389

(38.4%)

2,446

(57.8%)

2,943

(30.1%)
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Table 2: The choice to offer equity deferral options to outside directors
The table presents analyses for the determinants of the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to outside
directors in the year. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the hypothesized determinants. Panel B presents
univariate comparisons between firms that offer equity deferral options to outside directors and firms that do not and
results from a logit model for the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors. Sample for this table is
the the ExecuComp-RiskMetrics intersection over the period 1999-2009 with available data on the selected variables
(11,958 firm-years). We base z-statistics on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate significance at p <
0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10, respectively. All variables are defined in the text.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
N

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

Board Characteristics:
% Outside Directors
% Dir Equity Comp
% Dir Sharesheld
% Income Tax Rate

11,958
11,958
11,958
11,958

0.811
0.517
0.161 %
0.058

0.104
0.273
0.229 %
0.034

0.750
0.370
0.024 %
0.031

0.846
0.548
0.073 %
0.060

11,958

0.072

0.258

--

--

11,958
11,958
11,958
11,958
11,958

7.606
3.164
- 0.177
0.103
0.116

1.516
3.190
0.120
0.339
0.060

6.525
1.495
- 0.244
- 0.109
0.073

7.426
2.235
- 0.165
0.039
0.102

0.889
0.714
0.200 %
0.082

Executive Deferral Options:
Option To Executives

--

Firm Characteristics:
LogMVE t-1
MB t-1
Cash Flow Shortfall t-1
Stock Returns t-2,t-1
SD(Stock Returns t-2,t-1)

8.553
3.663
- 0.097
0.222
0.142

Panel B:
Firms Offering

Other Firms

N= 4,735

N= 7,223

Logit Results
MEffects

(z)

Board Characteristics:
% Outside Directors
% Dir Equity Comp
% Dir Sharesheld
% Income Tax Rate

0.848
0.504
0.106 %
0.057

(0.079)
(0.234)
(0.168 %)
(0.031)

0.787
0.526
0.197 %
0.059

(0.112)
(0.295)
(0.256 %)
(0.035)

***
***
***
**

0.923 ***
- 0.071 **
-20.065 ***
- 0.346

( 9.82)
(-2.36)
(-4.35)
(-1.22)

0.226 ***

( 7.33)

***

( 9.50)
(-1.81)
( 3.27)
(-3.14)
(-6.94)

Executive Deferral Options:
Option To Executives

0.139

(0.346)

0.028

(0.164)

***

8.203
3.146
- 0.157
0.086
0.096

(1.552)
(3.285)
(0.104)
(0.280)
(0.045)

7.214
3.175
- 0.190
0.114
0.129

(1.357)
(3.127)
(0.128)
(0.372)
(0.065)

***

Firm Characteristics:
LogMVEt-1
MB t-1
Cash Flow Shortfall t-1
Stock Returns t-2,t-1
SD(Stock Returns t-2,t-1)

***
***
***

0.068
- 0.004
0.255
- 0.045
- 1.180

***
***
***

Industry & Year FE
N
Pseudo R2
Pr > χ2
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YES
11,958
0.230
0.000

Table 3: Descriptive statistics on director equity deferrals
The table presents descriptive statistics on the equity deferral transactions registered by outside directors from the
subset of ExecuComp-RiskMetrics firms allowing equity deferral options to directors over the period 1999-2009
with available director- and firm-level characteristics. The sample for this table consists of 2,078 firm-years with at
least one deferring director and 9,935 directors-firm-years with equity deferral transactions as reported on the firm’s
SEC Forms 4 in Thompson Insider Filings Data. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the number and
proportion of outside directors who filed at least one equity deferral transaction at the firm. Panel B presents
statistics on the number of deferral transactions, the amount deferred per transaction, and the total amount deferred
in a year, expressed both in absolute value and as a proportion of the total cash compensation (i.e., the sum of annual
retainer and meeting fees) to be earned by the director in the year. The dollar value of the deferrals equal the value
of the deferred stock units on the day the transactions were filed, as reported in the “trandate” field in Thompson
Insider Filings Data. The total dollar value that was deferred is computed as the sum of the values of all the deferral
transactions the director filed in the year at the firm.
Panel A: Deferring Directors
Deferring Directors
% Outside Directors

N

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

2,078
2,078

5.957
0.598

3.671
0.318

3.000
0.300

6.000
0.625

9.000
0.900

9,935
9,935
9,935
9,935

6.215
36,311
135,787
0.819

5.610
68,015
321,154
0.306

2.000
6,302
31,951
0.724

4.000
15,090
75,255
1.000

8.000
36,120
137,102
1.000

Panel B: Amount Deferred
# Transactions Per Year
($) Deferred Per Transaction
($) Total Deferred Per Year
% Cash Deferred Per Year
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on director & firm characteristics
The table presents descriptive statistics on the selected director- and firm-level determinants of the director equity
deferrals. The sample for this table consists of all director-firm-years from the subset of ExecuComp-RiskMetrics
firms allowing equity deferral options to directors over the period 1999-2009 with available data on the selected
director- and firm-level characteristics (41,295 director-firm-years: 9,935 deferring directors and 31,360 nondeferring directors ). All variables are defined in the text.

Director and Firm Characteristics
N

Mean

SD

Q1

Median

Q3

41,295
41,295
41,295

54,495
0.495
0.217

32,709
0.244
0.412

32,500
0.377
--

48,000
0.519
--

71,000
0.651
--

41,295
41,295

0.662
0.080
0.211

0.473
0.272
0.089

--0.150

--0.200

--0.250

41,295

0.093

0.290

--

--

--

41,295
41,295
41,295

0.092
0.094
0.086

0.386
0.344
0.279

-0.149
-0.104
-0.093

0.075
0.071
0.050

0.285
0.251
0.208

41,295
41,295
41,295
41,295

0.161 %
0.715
0.091
8.03
1.81

0.644 %
0.451
0.288
6.83
0.86

0.000 %
--3
1

0.014 %
--6
2

0.057 %
--11
2

41,295
41,295

1.17
0.182

1.29
0.386

0
--

1
--

2
--

41,295
41,295

61.48
0.151

7.50
0.358

57
--

62
--

67
--

41,295
41,295
41,295

8.387
3.132
0.094

1.555
3.213
0.043

7.233
1.544
0.063

8.308
2.221
0.086

9.500
3.541
0.113

Panel A: Contractual features
Director Compensation:
Cash Deferrable
% Equity Comp
Ownership Guidelines
Deferral Options:
Alternative
Premium
Premium Amount (if Premium =1)
Panel B: Firm Prospects
Executive Deferrals:
Exe_Deferrals
Market Performance:
Stock Returns it+1
Stock Returns horizon
Stock Returns it-2,t-1
Panel C: Personal Characteristics
Profile Inside the Firm:
% Sharesheld
Met Guidelines (if Guidelines =1)
Acquisition
Tenure
Horizon
Profle Outside the Firm:
Other Boards
Executive
Other Characteristics:
Age
Female
Panel D: Firm-level Controls
LogMVE it-1
MB it-1
SD(Stock Returns it-2,t-1)

35

Table 5: Univariate comparisons between deferring & non-deferring directors
The table presents univariate comparisons between the sub-sample of outside directors electing to defer cash
compensation into equity in an year (i.e., deferring directors) and all other directors who received the same option
to defer cash into equity in the year but they did not exercise it (i.e., non-deferring directors). The sample for this
table consists of all director-firm-years from the subset of ExecuComp-RiskMetrics firms allowing equity deferral
options to directors over the period 1999-2009 with available data on the selected director- and firm-level
characteristics (41,295 director-firm-years: 9,935 deferring directors and 31,360 non-deferring directors ). ***, **, *
indicate significance levels at p < 0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10, respectively, from two-tailed t-tests for differences in
means between sub-samples. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. All variables are defined in the text.
Director and Firm Characteristics:

Deferring Directors

Non-Deferring Directors

N= 9,935 (24.0%)

N= 31,360 (76.0%)

Diff
(p<0.000)

Panel A: Contractual features
Director Compensation:
Cash Deferrable
% Equity Comp
Ownership Guidelines

57,025
0.504
0.249

(32,608)
(0.231)
(0.434)

53,694
0.492
0.206

(32,701)
(0.248)
(0.404)

***
***
***

0.663
0.123
0.207

(0.473)
(0.329)
(0.094)

0.662
0.067
0.214

(0.473)
(0.249)
(0.086)

***
*

0.199

(0.399)

0.059

(0.236)

***

0.113
0.114
0.070

(0.351)
(0.306)
(0.244)

0.086
0.088
0.091

(0.396)
(0.355)
(0.289)

***
***
***

(0.681 %)
(0.445)
(0.292)
(6.99)
(0.87)

***
***
***
***
***

Deferral Option:
Alternative
Premium
Premium Amount (if Premium =1)
Panel B: Firm Prospects
Executive Deferrals:
Exe_Deferrals
Market Performance:
Stock Returns it+1
Stock Returns horizon
Stock Returns it-2,t-1
Panel C: Personal Characteristics
Profile Inside the Firm:
% Sharesheld
Met Guidelines (if Guidelines =1)
Acquisition
Tenure
Horizon

0.106 %
0.685
0.083
7.83
1.75

(0.511 %)
(0.465)
(0.276)
(6.32)
(0.84)

0.178 %
0.727
0.094
8.10
1.83

Profle Outside the Firm:
Other Boards
Executive

1.33
0.211

(1.33)
(0.408)

1.12
0.173

(1.27)
(0.378)

***
***

61.63
0.151

(7.16)
(0.358)

61.43
0.151

(7.61)
(0.358)

*

8.722
3.338
0.091

(1.559)
(3.487)
(0.043)

8.281
3.066
0.094

(1.539)
(3.118)
(0.043)

***
***
***

Other Characteristics:
Age
Female
Panel D: Firm-level Controls
LogMVE it-1
MB it-1
SD(Stock Returns it-2,t-1)
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Table 6: Determinants of director equity deferrals: overall sample
The table presents results from OLS models for the natural logarithm of the total dollar value deferred by the
director in the year. The total dollar value that was deferred is computed as the sum of the values from all the
deferral transactions the director recorded in the year. The dollar value of the deferral transactions equal the value of
the deferred stock units on the day the transactions were filed, as reported in the “trandate” field in Thompson
Insider Filings Data. The model in Column I regresses the value of the equity deferrals on our set of determinants
plus firm fixed-effects. Column II replicates the model after including the Inverse-Mills ratio from the logit
estimates in Table 2 – Panel B for the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options to directors in the year. The
sample for this table consists of all director-firm-years from the subset of ExecuComp-RiskMetrics firms allowing
equity deferral options to directors over the period 1999-2009 with available data on the selected director- and firmlevel characteristics. We estimate standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by the directors’ identification numbers
(the “did” field in RiskMetrics). ***, **, * indicate significance levels at p < 0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10, respectively. All
variables are defined in the text.
Dependent Variable →

Ln(Total Deferred in Year)
I

Constant

II

3.086

( 2.91)

***

4.933

(4.43)

***

Cash Deferrable
% Equity Comp
Ownership Guidelines

0.000
0.493
0.226

( 4.13)
( 3.53)
( 1.96)

***
***
*

0.000
0.503
0.148

( 3.71)
( 3.36)
( 1.26)

***
***

Alternative
Premium Amount

0.402
8.061

( 1.86)
( 6.20)

*
***

0.433
7.938

( 1.87)
( 6.18)

*
***

2.339
0.444
-0.316

(17.94)
( 7.34)
(-4.10)

***
***
***

1.906
0.334
-0.209

(13.95)
( 5.44)
(-2.58)

***
***
***

-25.707
0.061
-0.067
0.099
0.034

(-5.33)
( 0.55)
(-0.98)
( 2.80)
( 0.62)

***

-25.647
0.096
-0.054
0.084
-0.009

(-5.25)
( 0.86)
(-0.75)
( 2.32)
(-0.17)

***

0.100
0.192

( 2.03)
( 2.70)

**
***

0.105
0.220

( 2.15)
( 3.04)

**
***

-0.303
-0.179

(-1.29)
(-2.45)

**

-0.264
-0.174

(-1.10)
(-2.37)

**

-0.067
0.011
-0.821

(-1.08)
( 1.05)
(-1.14)

-0.262
0.032
2.009

(-3.89)
( 2.87)
( 2.61)

***
***
***

-0.899

(-8.69)

***

Contractual features

Firm Prospects
Exe_Deferrals
Stock Returns horizon
Stock Returns t-2,t-1
Personal Characteristics
% Sharesheld
Met Guidelines*Guidelines
Acquisition
Ln(Tenure)
Ln(Horizon)
Ln(Other Boards)
Executive
Ln(Age)
Female

***

**

Firm-level Controls
Ln(MVE) t-1
MB t-1
SD(Stock Returns t-2,t-1)
MillsRatio
Firm FE

YES

YES

N
Adj. R2

41,295
0.486

38,597
0.496
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Table 7: Determinants of director equity deferrals: multiple-board directors
The table replicates the models in Table 6 over the sub-sample of directors sitting on more than one board in the
year (i.e., 3,341 distinct directors in 20,101 director-firm-years). The model in Columns I regresses the value of the
equity deferrals on our set of determinants plus firm fixed-effects. Column II replicates the model after including the
Inverse-Mills ratio from the logit estimates in Table 2 – Panel B for the firm’s choice to offer equity deferral options
to directors in the year. We estimate standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by the directors’ identification
numbers (the “did” field in RiskMetrics). ***, **, * indicate significance levels at p < 0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10,
respectively. All variables are defined in the text.
Dependent Variable →

Ln(Total Deferred in Year)
I

Constant

2.160

( 1.54)

Cash Deferrable
% Equity Comp
Ownership Guidelines

0.000
0.596
0.044

( 5.06)
( 3.25)
( 0.30)

Alternative
Premium Amount

0.386
8.352

II
5.174

(3.60)

***

***
***

0.000
0.614
-0.024

( 4.67)
( 3.25)
(-0.16)

***
***

( 1.67)
( 5.71)

*
***

0.390
8.178

( 1.66)
( 5.63)

*
***

1.947
0.635
-0.536

(12.60)
( 7.25)
(-4.95)

***
***
***

1.577
0.508
-0.361

( 9.64)
( 5.81)
(-3.24)

***
***
***

-43.266
0.086
-0.133
0.125
-0.127

(-7.38)
( 0.62)
(-1.33)
( 3.03)
(-1.23)

***

-46.460
0.113
-0.088
0.160
-0.159

(-7.52)
( 0.82)
(-0.86)
( 3.84)
(-1.52)

***

0.081
0.244

( 1.07)
( 3.45)

***

0.110
0.262

( 1.44)
( 3.67)

***

-0.108
-0.188

(-0.36)
(-2.36)

**

-0.323
-0.219

(-1.05)
(-2.73)

***

-0.012
0.007
-0.875

(-0.16)
( 0.54)
(-0.89)

-0.231
0.029
2.423

(-2.86)
( 2.27)
( 2.30)

***
**
***

-1.148

(-8.73)

***

Contractual features

Firm Prospects
Exe_Deferrals
Stock Returns horizon
Stock Returns t-2,t-1
Personal Characteristics
% Sharesheld
Met Guidelines*Guidelines
Acquisition
Ln(Tenure)
Ln(Horizon)
Ln(Other Boards)
Executive
Ln(Age)
Female

***

***

Firm-level Controls
Ln(MVE) t-1
MB t-1
SD(Stock Returns t-2,t-1)
MillsRatio
Firm FE

YES

YES

N
Adj. R2

20,101
0.474

19,008
0.489
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Table 8: Abnormal returns following director equity deferrals
The table reports summary statistics and significance tests on the abnormal returns following director equity
deferral transactions (53,015 transactions). RET(t+60), RET(t+180), RET(t+360) are the buy-and-hold returns over
the +60, +180, +360 days following the equity deferral transactions dates (i.e., the “trandate” field in Thompson
Insider Filings Data). RET(horizon) cumulates returns between the transaction date and the end of the year in which
the director will end her current mandate. RET(final) cumulates returns between the transaction date and the end of
the year in which the director will end her last mandate at the firm. Market-adjusted returns are the difference
between the firm’s stock returns and the market returns, where the S&P 500 Composite Index is used as a proxy for
the market portfolio. Benchmark-adjusted returns are the difference between the firm’s stock returns and the returns
predicted by the size, book-to-market and momentum model as in Daniel et al. (1997). Panel A compares the
abnormal returns of sample directors’ equity deferrals to the returns non-deferring directors would have realized if
they had exercised their option to defer at their firm on the annual board meeting date. Panel B replicates the
analyses within the sub-sample of multiple-board directors electing to defer in some firms but not all of the firms
offering equity deferral options between 1999 and 2009. For the sub-sample of firms where multiple-board
directors did not register equity deferral transactions in the year we assume that the election would have occurred
on the annual board meeting date. ***, **, * indicate significance levels at p < 0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10, respectively, from
two-tailed t-tests for differences in means between sub-samples.
Panel A: Overall Sample
Director Deferred = 1

Director Deferred = 0

Mkt-Adj Returns

Mean

SD

p-value

Mean

SD

p-value

RET (t+60)
RET (t+180)
RET (t+360)
RET (horizon)
RET (final)

0.025
0.070
0.137
0.212
0.374

(0.160)
(0.272)
(0.379)
(0.478)
(0.936)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.016
0.046
0.108
0.181
0.277

(0.154)
(0.282)
(0.415)
(0.918)
(1.390)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Benchmark-Adj Returns

Mean

SD

p-value

Mean

SD

p-value

RET (t+60)
RET (t+180)
RET (t+360)
RET (horizon)
RET (final)

0.005
0.012
0.016
0.015
0.012

(0.151)
(0.239)
(0.309)
(0.348)
(0.492)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

- 0.001
- 0.004
0.003
0.000
- 0.014

(0.145)
(0.245)
(0.352)
(0.498)
(0.600)

0.331
0.000
0.079
0.777
0.000

N

53,015

Diff
(p<0.000)
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***

31,360

Panel B: Multiple-Board Directors
Director Deferred = 1

Director Deferred = 0

Mkt-Adj Returns

Mean

SD

p-value

Mean

SD

p-value

RET (t+60)
RET (t+180)
RET (t+360)
RET (horizon)
RET (final)

0.024
0.071
0.138
0.218
0.382

(0.161)
(0.276)
(0.388)
(0.502)
(0.933)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.017
0.045
0.110
0.194
0.309

(0.153)
(0.279)
(0.415)
(1.055)
(1.777)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Benchmark-Adj Returns

Mean

SD

p-value

Mean

SD

p-value

RET (t+60)
RET (t+180)
RET (t+360)
RET (horizon)
RET (final)

0.005
0.016
0.024
0.026
0.019

(0.152)
(0.243)
(0.321)
(0.363)
(0.498)

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.001
- 0.004
0.009
0.017
- 0.002

(0.143)
(0.243)
(0.353)
(0.541)
(0.670)

0.165
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.555

Director Deferred = 1

N

28,536

***
***
***
***
***

Director Deferred = 0

14,651
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Diff
(p<0.000)

***
***
***
**
***

Table 9: Cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns
The table provides multivariate analyses for the trading performance of director equity deferrals as a function of
selected firm, board and director compensation plans characteristics. The sample for this table consists of 49,422
equity deferrals registered by outside directors between 1999 and 2009 with available data on the selected variables.
Panel A (Panel B) reports results for cumulated market-adjusted (benchmark-adjusted) returns at the +60, +180,
+360 days following the equity deferral transactions dates (i.e., the “trandate” field in Thompson Insider Filings
Data). RET(horizon) cumulates returns between the equity deferral transaction date and the end of the year in which
the director will end her current mandate. Bad Governance is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003) Governance Index falls into the top quartile of sample distribution. % Insiders measure the
proportion of board members with RiskMetrics “dirtype” field equal to “E” (i.e., “Employee”). Analysts Following
measure the number of analysts following the firm in the year as the retrieved from IBES. Management Forecasts is
the number of forecasts issued by the firm’s executive in the year. Audit, Governance, and Compensation are
indicator variables equal to 1if the director serves on the audit, governance, and compensation committee,
respectively. Attendance is an indicator variable for whether the director attended more than 75% of the board
meetings. Transaction size is the number of shares traded scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the
beginning of the quarter. All models include firm fixed-effects and cluster standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered
by the directors’ identification numbers (the “did” field in RiskMetrics). ***, **, * indicate significance levels at p <
0.01, p<0.05, p<0.10, respectively.
Panel A:

Mkt-Adj Returns
RET (t+60)

Constant

RET (t+180)

RET (t+360)

RET (horizon)

0.161

( 7.57)***

0.370

( 7.67)***

0.521

( 6.99)***

0.879

( 7.17)***

Bad Governance
% Insiders
Board Size
Analysts Following
Management Forecasts
Audit
Governance
Compensation
Attendance

0.008
0.079
- 0.008
- 0.003
- 0.002
0.001
- 0.001
0.002
- 0.012

( 1.89)*
( 3.42)***
(-9.11)***
(-7.36)***
(-3.00)***
( 0.55)
(-0.46)
( 0.87)
(-0.92)

0.027
0.186
- 0.013
- 0.008
- 0.009
0.001
- 0.005
- 0.000
- 0.023

( 3.23)***
( 2.87)***
(-6.88)***
( 8.96)***
(-5.77)***
( 0.18)
(-1.30)
(-0.08)
(-0.83)

0.042
0.687
- 0.015
- 0.014
- 0.015
0.005
- 0.006
0.001
- 0.034

( 3.17)***
( 6.40)***
(-4.82)***
(-8.58)***
(-6.54)***
( 0.77)
(-0.81)
( 0.15)
(-0.77)

0.066
0.999
- 0.019
- 0.016
- 0.025
0.004
- 0.018
0.004
- 0.080

( 3.56)***
( 6.27)***
(-3.92)***
( 7.86)***
(-7.62)***
( 0.45)
(-1.66)*
( 0.39)
(-1.57)

Ownership Guidelines
Premium Amount
% Income Tax Rate

- 0.006
- 0.066
- 0.140

(-1.67)*
(-0.83)
(-0.66)

- 0.009
- 0.639
- 0.278

(-1.14)
(-4.21)***
(-0.52)

- 0.039
- 0.840
- 0.887

(-2.78)***
(-3.24)***
(-1.06)

- 0.055
- 1.473
- 3.771

(-2.96)***
(-7.62)***
(-2.84)***

0.006

( 2.38)**

0.018

( 2.76)***

0.021

( 2.88)***

0.024

( 3.25)***

Transaction Size
Firm FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

N
Adj. R2

49,422
0.111

49,422
0.140

49,422
0.236

49,422
0.330

RET (t+60)

RET (t+180)

Panel B:
Constant

Benchmark-Adj Returns
RET (t+360)

RET (horizon)

0.107

( 5.17)***

0.175

( 4.01)***

0.159

( 2.31)**

0.367

( 4.15)***

Bad Governance
% Insiders
Board Size
Analysts Following
Management Forecasts
Audit
Governance
Compensation
Attendance

0.007
0.018
- 0.005
- 0.003
0.001
- 0.000
- 0.000
0.001
- 0.009

( 2.08)**
( 0.84)
(-6.37)***
(-6.60)***
( 1.75)*
(-0.02)
(-0.03)
( 0.70)
(-0.73)

0.037
0.108
- 0.008
- 0.006
- 0.003
- 0.001
- 0.001
0.000
- 0.015

( 5.07)***
( 1.98)**
(-4.82)***
(-6.95)***
(-2.24)**
(-0.35)
(-0.54)
( 0.14)
(-0.57)

0.063
0.533
- 0.009
- 0.009
- 0.007
0.005
0.004
0.005
- 0.025

( 5.60)***
( 5.98)***
(-3.80)***
(-5.72)***
(-3.26)***
( 0.92)
( 0.70)
( 0.79)
(-0.63)

0.083
0.578
- 0.019
- 0.010
- 0.012
0.010
0.008
0.014
- 0.077

( 5.70)***
( 5.07)***
(-5.00)***
(-5.56)***
(-4.85)***
( 1.45)
( 1.11)
( 1.93)*
(-1.95)*

Ownership Guidelines
Premium Amount
% Income Tax Rate

- 0.009
- 0.149
- 0.115

(-3.21)***
(-1.84)*
(-0.55)

- 0.017
- 0.417
0.259

(-2.49)**
(-3.92)***
( 0.54)

- 0.042
- 0.777
0.882

(-3.69)***
(-5.05)***
( 1.13)

- 0.065
- 1.027
0.235

(-4.20)***
(-7.99)***
( 0.25)

0.004

( 2.22)**

0.011

( 2.55)**

0.014

( 2.71)***

0.011

( 2.37)***

Transaction Size

Firm FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

N
Adj. R2

49,422
0.111

49,422
0.133

49,422
0.226

49,422
0.288
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Table 10: Director equity deferrals around earnings announcements
The table provides average transaction size and values of sample directors’ equity and open market stock purchases
around earnings announcement days (day 0). The sample for Panel A consists of 53,015 equity deferrals and 10,081
open market purchases registered by the outside directors in firms allowing director equity deferrals between 1999
and 2009. The sample for Panel B consists of 53,015 equity deferrals and 3,130 open market purchases registered
by the outside directors in firms registering at least one director equity deferral transaction between 1999 and 2009.
Transaction size is the number of shares traded scaled by number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the
quarter. We multiply transaction size with 1,000 for ease of exposition. Transaction value ($) measures the dollar
value of the shares on the day the transactions were filed, as reported in the “trandate” field in Thompson Insider
Filings Data. Observations are split into 2 groups based on whether they occur in blackout periods or not. Blackout
period is -47 to +2 days trading days relative to earnings announcement day and non-blackout period is +3 to +12
trading days relative to earnings announcement day. To calculate the statistics in this table, we first sum total equity
deferrals and open market purchases for each firm-day and then compute transaction size means across firm-days.
Panel A: All firms allowing director equity deferrals

Transaction Size:
Non-Blackout Days
Blackout Days
Diff (p<0.000)
Transaction Values ($):
Non-Blackout Days
Blackout Days

Equity Deferrals
N
Mean
7,020
35,100

0.0055
0.0043

Open Market Purchases
N
Mean

Diff (p<0.000)

7,020
35,100

-0.0082 (***)
0.0006 (***)

0.0139
0.0037

0.0012 (***)

0.0101 (***)

Equity Deferrals
N
Mean

Open Market Purchases
N
Mean

7,020
35,100

20,302
15,691

7,020
35,100

4,612 (***)

Diff (p<0.000)

30,101
8,203

Diff (p<0.000)
-9,187 (***)
7,471 (***)

21,899 (***)

Panel B: Firms with at least one deferring director

Transaction Size:
Non-Blackout Days
Blackout Days
Diff (p<0.000)
Transaction Values ($):
Non-Blackout Days
Blackout Days
Diff (p<0.000)

Equity Deferrals
N
Mean
4,140
20,700

Open Market Purchases
N
Mean

0.0112
0.0085

4,140
20,700

0.0046
0.0012

0.0027 (***)

0.0035 (***)

Equity Deferrals
N
Mean

Open Market Purchases
N
Mean

4,140
20,700

42,769
31,360

4,140
20,700

11,409 (***)

17,659
4,606

13,053 (***)
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Diff (p<0.000)
0.0065 (***)
0.0074 (***)

Diff (p<0.000)
25,594 (***)
26,729 (***)

Figure 1: Number of transactions by time of the year
The figure plots the average number of director equity deferral transactions by day of the year. The sample for this
figure consists of 53,015 transactions filed by 9,935 outside directors in 2,078 firms with available data on
ExecuComp and RiskMetrics between 1999 and 2009.
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Figure 2: Abnormal returns around director equity deferrals
The figure plots cumulative abnormal stock returns following sample directors’ equity deferral transaction dates
(day 0). The sample for this figure consists of 53,015 transactions filed by 9,935 outside directors in 2,078 firms
with available data on ExecuComp and RiskMetrics between 1999 and 2009. The figure shows the cumulative
abnormal returns from 30 days before through 360 days after the equity deferrals’ transaction dates. Marketadjusted returns are the difference between the firm’s stock returns and the market returns, where the S&P 500
Composite Index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. Benchmark-adjusted returns are the difference
between the firm’s stock returns and the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) benchmark returns. For
ease of exposition, we multiply abnormal returns measures by 100.
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Figure 3: Director equity deferrals around earnings announcement dates
The figure plots the average transaction size of directors’ equity deferrals and open market purchases around
earnings announcement dates. The sample for figure A consists of 53,015 equity deferrals and 10,081 open market
purchases registered by the outside directors in firms allowing director equity deferrals between 1999 and 2009.
The sample for figure B consists of 53,015 equity deferrals and 3,130 open market purchases registered by the
outside directors in firms registering at least one director equity deferral transaction between 1999 and 2009.
Transaction size is number of shares traded scaled by number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the quarter.
We multiply transaction size with 1,000 for ease of exposition. In order to construct this plot, we first sum total
equity deferrals and open market purchases for each firm-day and then compute transaction size means across firmdays.
Figure 3.A: All firms allowing director equity deferrals

Figure 3.B: Firms with at least one deferring director
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